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BETWEEN THE WORKSHOP AND THE STATE: TRAINING HUMAN CAPITAL IN RAILROAD 
COMPANIES IN MEXICO AND CHILE, 1850-1930 *  
  
GUILLERMO A. GUAJARDO SOTO 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the human capital training strategies adopted between the 1850s and 
1930s by railroad companies in Mexico and Chile. These two countries enable one to 
contrast the different routes taken by the same type of firm, technology and labor force. A 
propos of this, we suggest that because of its complexity, capital intensity and new work 
methods, railway technology had a positive impact on human capital training in the cases 
studied. During the period when railways were the main form of land transport studied -
covered by this study- they combined the labor force with foreign workers and modern 
technology and it was not until well into the 20th century that a formal system of technical 
schools was established. Instead, informal and formal learning cycles and routes tended to be 
followed. That is why this paper considers three aspects: I) the institutional and social factors 
that helped or hindered industrial operations, maintenance and production training; II) the 
way learning, training and talent retention cycles were shaped and talent migrated towards 
other activities or was dispersed or lost; and lastly, III) how training was institutionalized 
through what were known as “firm schools” responsible for training human capital as an 
internalization response to coping with shortages in the labor market. 
 
Key words: human capital, technology, railways, México, Chile. 
JEL codes:  N76, J24, O33 
 
 
 
___________________ 
 
* This document presents some results of the "Innovation, firms and state in Mexico and Latin 
America: theories, methodologies and interdisciplinary practices" research project being undertaken 
at CEIICH and the "Railroad workshops and the origins of industry in Mexico and Chile, 1850-1950: 
a historical study of technological transfer and innovation", financed  in 2007 and 2008 by the 
institutional fund/ basic science through project no. 52635 of the Mexican National Council of 
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INTRODUCTION 
Between 1850 and 1930, Latin American economies received a wave of foreign investment 
that led to various changes on several fronts through railroad, electricity, mining, smelting, 
refining and industrial manufacturing. These firms were forced to use technology and the 
capital incorporated into personnel training -human capital- in contexts of high illiteracy, 
institutional instability and cultural obstacles. Knowing how firms developed the intangible 
assets of their labor force under these conditions is still an issue that has barely been 
researched by economic history and the history of firms in the Latin American region. The 
past few years, however, have seen increased knowledge of the main trajectories,[1] and 
more recently, researchers have begun to show an interest innovation, technology, labor and 
business strategies.[2]  
 This paper analyzes the human capital training strategies adopted by Mexican and 
Chilean railway companies from 1850 to 1930. Neither country has an established tradition 
of comparative studies, unlike Argentina and Uruguay, which have been analyzed within the 
group of "recent colonies" (since they share features with Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand). They do, however, enable one to contrast the different routes taken by the same 
type of firm, technology and labor force, within a common scenario of economic 
backwardness.[3] A propos of this, we suggest that because of its complexity, capital 
intensity and new work methods, railway technology had a positive impact on human capital 
training in the cases studied. During the period when railways were the main form of land 
transport studied -covered by this study- they combined the labor force with foreign workers 
and modern technology and it was not until well into the 20th century that a formal system 
of technical schools was established. Instead, informal and formal learning cycles and routes 
tended to be followed. That is why this paper considers three aspects: The paper therefore 
considers three issues: I) the institutional and social factors that helped or hindered industrial 
operations, maintenance and production training; II) the way learning, training and talent 
retention cycles were shaped and how talent migrated towards other activities or was 
dispersed or lost; and III) the way training was institutionalized through what were known as 
“firm schools” responsible for training human capital as an internalization response to 
coping with shortages in the labor market. 
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 In this respect, authors such as Galor and Moav (2006) and Goldin (2001) have 
stressed the complementarity that arose in the 19th century between physical and human 
capital, due to technological change, the scale and complexity of the firms that increased the 
demand for skilled labor and businessmen's interest in supporting public education. Chandler 
(1977) had already pointed out that since the second half of the 19th century, the 
development of communication technologies, such as the railway, the telegraphy and 
subsequently the telephone had led to the emergence of large industrial firms organized at 
various levels, with knowledge hierarchies and to the expansion of post-elementary 
education in the United States as from 1910. This enabled firms to become incorporated into 
the growing stock of scientific and technical knowledge. For Goldin, then, the modern 
concept of the wealth of nations emerged in the early 20th century with the incorporation of 
human capital.[4]  
 Several relevant cases attest to this phenomenon. The transport revolution, begun by 
railways in the Great Britain, United States, Belgium and France, permitted specialization 
and innovation in the production of equipment and machine tools as well as new work skills. 
Fishlow and Rosenberg posited that in the United States before the Civil War (1861–1865), 
the repair workshops set up in agrarian areas helped speed up and direct technical knowledge 
towards other sectors of the economy. Atack, Haines and Margo have highlighted the 
positive effect of railways on encouraging the shift of U.S. artisanal production towards 
industrial production before the 1870s. Their export to backward regions such as India 
created a new job market for both Americans and a large number of local workers.[5]  
 In Latin America, this complementarity has lagged. Achieving it took the entire 20th 
century and the results are still insufficient, although advances have been recorded in some 
sectors. In particular, the fact that much of the investment should have materialized in 
railways yielded a number of advantages since this means of transport combined workshops, 
labor and the demand for engineering products. In societies with large estates and political 
instability such as Latin America, in addition to having to cope with enormous challenges, 
railway technology also provided a wonderful opportunity to provide technical training in 
societies where 80–90% of the population were illiterate. The Latin American experience 
has involved paradoxes and imbalances, since in 1914, when high illiteracy levels had been 
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recorded, the region was the second largest destination of international investments after the 
so-called “new” Western countries (United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand).[6]  
 These paradoxes were present in the case studies. Coatsworth established that until 
1911, railways in Mexico provided “virtually no incentive for industrial development” 
despite the fact that since 1903, the country had had steel production in blast furnaces, which 
did not tip the balance against imports. Oppenheimer said that railway construction in Chile 
in the central part of the country between 1850 and 1885 made it more dependent on the 
importation of European technology and foreign professionals. However, it should be 
pointed out that according to Lewis and this author's own research, by 1910, railway 
workshops in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico were already major 
industrial installations that produced a certain amount of rolling stock and contributed their 
human capital to other sectors of the economy.[7]  
 In order to explain these phenomena, the paper is organized into five sections that 
deal with the railway's capacity to complement physical and human capital; international 
models for training intangible productive assets in the labor sphere and their translation and 
adaptation to Mexico and Chile. The last section contains the conclusions. 
 
1.- RAILWAYS, AN ACTIVITY THAT COMPLEMENTS PHYSICAL AND HUMAN CAPITAL 
From the outset, the railway firm was a great firm that differs in certain respects from the 
industrial firm analyzed by Chandler (1977, 1990), which should be considered to study its 
demands for human capital. 
 The railway is a service firm whose business is the sale of overland mobility through 
the integration of marketing, communication, traffic, construction and both civil and 
mechanical engineering that extends across large stretches of territory to operate in a 
balanced, coordinated fashion. Infrastructure in a set territory shaped the business, meaning 
that its organization had knowledge hierarchies and multiple levels that did not operate as an 
industry confined by the space in which it was produced. A railway operates in a multi-
localized, simultaneous and interactive fashion with its market through a standardized 
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organization that is present in several places with various premises, personnel, technologies 
and information to shift an asset or a person from one place to another. In this respect, it has 
the Chandlerian attribute of scope for its activity. 
 A crucial aspect for Latin America is that the railway was an activity that enjoyed 
early state intervention. This differs from Chandler’s view that large private corporations 
mobilized massive resources in production, distribution and financing.[8] Lastly, the railway 
had industrial capacities that are difficult to describe and that do not correspond to those of 
an industrial firm. 
 During the steam era, it was a technology that fully complemented physical and 
human capital, whose handling required a lengthy learning process. It called for personnel 
with vertical hierarchies to be able to work with various capacities and skills at the workshop 
and railway network level. Traffic personnel had a rigid hierarchy and discipline for carrying 
out orders, as well as knowledge about the legal rules and regulations and technical 
characteristics of the train’s formation (which varied from day to day). Engineers and 
firemen had the ability to provide movement, drive, supply, anticipate a flaw and arrive at 
the engine shed knowing what repairs had to be done as a result of the journey. 
 There were two main areas in the maintenance workshop: engines and material that 
had been towed in that could not be organized as an industry of standardized, continuous 
processes, except in certain parts of the process. Instead, artisanal forms had to be combined 
with industrial ones to deal with a wide range of equipment, tasks and contingencies. 
 Workshops used reverse engineering to break down a vehicle into its component 
parts, repair it, re-assemble it and manufacture spare parts, reproducing limited amounts of 
the manufacturers’ parts and pieces. This might create the impression of being autarchic, 
which it was not, because several kinds of communication networks and logistics converged 
on the railway workshop. Its directors had to be aware of the new types of equipment and 
materials, input prices, how to respect manufacturers’ patents, what improvements should be 
incorporated into the engines and carriages and where to hire a first-rate mechanic and 
transfer him from one hemisphere to another. 
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 All these processes were highly labor-intensive and converged on a single activity: 
maintenance. Despite its being a crucial activity in all modern firms, studies on maintenance 
are virtually non-existent, although its importance was pointed out by Hirschman (1958), 
who observed that it provided an opportunity for Latin American labor to train in 
technology-intensive industries, where “they could acquire the habit of maintenance, which 
would then extend to the rest of the economy.”[9] Hirschman’s statement holds true for 
Chile, where workers trained in mechanical maintenance were employed in other sectors of 
the economy long before 1929 (Guajardo 1990, 1992, 1993, 2008). 
 Maintenance training was an activity that had to adjust to a set organization, 
institution and work culture that was transferred from the railway producing centers. Great 
Britain and the United States were the main references for Chile and Mexico that coexisted 
with French, Belgium and German references, which American technology and organization 
would begin to dominate from 1900 onwards. 
 
2.- TWO MODELS OF HUMAN CAPITAL TRAINING: GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 
Railway technology was internationally disseminated, with innovations taking place in an 
increasingly global market. This situation, however, did not displace the original matrix that 
defined the organization, operation and training of its personnel and shaped the activities of 
the workshops that provided everyday support for mobility. Workshops incorporated 
technological progress as well as training the labor force. 
 The initial matrix of many Latin American, particularly South American, railways 
was Great Britain, whence a workshop organization was transferred that also considered the 
production of its own rolling stock. The latter can be explained by the strongly 
hierarchically, artisanal form of industrial work that was still present in 19th century Great 
Britain, where workshop and material overseers wielded enormous decision-making power 
over purchases and production. Consequently, early railways began building their own 
engines and carriages since they had acquired industrial skills, while independent industrial 
firms specialized mainly in exports. Material production was governed by the "purchaser's 
initiative" which determined the characteristics of assets and dictated innovation, a pattern 
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that was reproduced on the American continent in Canada where, from the 1860s onwards, 
lines such as the Grand Trunk and the Great Western built their own carriages, engines and 
machinery, which provided a significant boost for industrialization.[10]  
 The situation was different in the United States, where the technological initiative 
was largely assumed by the manufacturer, who influenced equipment buyers and operators. 
In a new country, without artisanal traditions, with a labor shortage, an abundance of natural 
resources, a border that was expanding its domestic market and encouraging rapid industrial 
growth, a more practical, flexible business profile was created to provide less expensive 
solutions.[11] The railway’s response was that equipment production was externalized 
towards independent providers, leaving the workshops for maintenance, although they 
preserved a certain industrial margin. During the 1890s, companies such as the Pennsylvania 
Railroad and Baltimore & Ohio built engines in their workshops and by 1900, nearly 90% of 
the engines had been built by independent firms, unlike British railroads, which were self-
sufficient. Some repair workshops were also great carriage producers: Between 1872 and 
1873, railway company workshops built 38% of the country’s freight wagons, producing 
143,000 by 1900.[12]  
 Unlike British workshops, in American companies decisions were made by traffic 
and railway engineers responsible for the movement of trains, transport marketing and 
extending the lines, leaving the heads of the workshops in the third line of decision making. 
This also materialized in the American tendency to produce equipment with materials and 
designs compatible with earning conditions and expectations.[13] The strategy was 
institutionalized in the “American system” of producing exchangeable parts and pieces for 
manufacturing large quantities of goods that would lead to the mass industrial production of 
the 20th century.[14] Conversely, the British industry operated with higher costs because of 
its fragmentation and the limited amount to be produced. This was reflected in the lack of 
homogeneity of its assets. Firms were forced to have high, “inward” vertical integration, as a 
solution to cooperation and communication problems due to the difficulties of 
subcontracting parts of the production process, particularly precision parts.[15]  
 Thus, “Atlantic” forms could take one of two routes: externalization (as in the United 
States), or internalization (as in Great Britain) as summarized in Table 1. 
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[Table 1] 
 This also applied to human capital training, since in the British case there was an 
educational internalization through apprentices’ school that produced skilled workers, of 
which James Watt & Co. was the most successful example. This was an initiative by the 
middle and working classes that together encouraged the creation of education and 
professional institutions for the industry. The situation was different in the United States, 
where there was a tendency towards externalization in schools outside firms guided by a 
distinct utilitarianism that linked engineers’ and technicians’ training to industrialists’ 
interests.[16]  
 The competition between these paradigms was in turn transferred to the Latin 
American region. 
 As from the 1850s, the initial pattern of railway expansion in Latin America was 
influenced by Americans in countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile. The financial 
conditions of these endeavors, however, led to the predominance of British business 
management, as happened in railways along the Pacific Coast of Peru and Chile. In Mexico, 
British influence focused on the slow construction of the line between the port of Veracruz 
and Mexico City, which received French, American, British and Belgian technological 
contributions until its inauguration in 1873. From the 1880s onwards, however, the main 
trunk lines began to be built with American investment, organization and technology,[17]  
creating a technological model with powerful transnational links and growing 
standardization, although this did not mean that their workshops became the basis of a local 
industry. 
 In Chile, these two paradigms began to compete at an early stage in the central part of 
the country, where railway lines were publicly owned from the 1850s onwards, eventually 
becoming consolidated as a single state firm in 1884. This was expressed in different styles, 
since British influence led to the internalization of production in the railway workshops and 
skilled labor that migrated to other sectors of the economy. Thus, the case studies show 
differences based on the role played by the state in relation to competing paradigms. As 
Vertova points out, the historic possibility of specialization in advanced technologies has 
required the institutional restructuring of the economic and social bases. In this process, state 
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intervention plays a key role in mobilizing accumulated knowledge and the productive and 
institutional base.[18]   
 
3.- THE TRANSLATION OF HUMAN CAPITAL TRAINING MODELS IN CHILE AND MEXICO 
As noted earlier, Mexico and Chile do not share a broad tradition of comparative studies. 
Mexico is a country with an ancient, pre-Hispanic tradition, while Chile has an old mestizo 
population with a small contribution of immigrants during the 19th century, with significant 
differences in size. In 1900, Mexico had 13.6 million inhabitants, while Chile’s population 
was barely 2.9 million. By the 1950s, they had populations of 27 and 6 million, 
respectively.[19] Chile is a long way from the world’s industrial centers, which did not, 
however, prevent it from trading with England in 1820. Mexico shares a 3,326-km border 
with the United States, which accounts for 80% of its foreign trade. 
 In both countries, the agrarian sector has had considerable economic and political 
importance, albeit with specific differences that explain why Chile did not experience an 
agrarian revolution. Mexico entered the 19th century with a widespread indigenous 
communal agriculture, unlike Chile, where indigenous communities were scattered and not 
organized, enabling landowners to exert greater control over both the land and the work. 
These conditions enabled it to export wheat to Australia, California and Great Britain from 
the 1840s onwards. Nevertheless, mining exports dominated and displaced agriculture in 
exports, enabling it to generate the fiscal income required for an increasingly centralized 
national state. All of these elements made Chile a successful case of export growth before 
1914.[20]  
 Mexico had to wait until after 1876 to achieve the minimum conditions of political 
stability that would enable it to ensure property rights and attract foreign investment. From 
1877 to 1910, per capita income in Mexico increased at an annual rate of 2.3%, achieving an 
export income of $10.7 USD in 1912, approaching Brazil’s rate of $14.2 and making it the 
country with the largest amount of direct foreign investment. In 1914, of a total of $7,569 
million USD in foreign investment in Latin America  –in addition to large receiving 
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countries such as Argentina and Brazil– 15% was in Mexico, ahead of Chile, which received 
6.5%.[21]  
 This performance was altered by the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution in 1910 and 
the First World War in 1914. Although Chile felt the economic impact of the European 
conflict, it did not change its laws to prevent investment. Conversely, in 1917, Mexico 
established nationalistic laws discouraging foreign investment and private property rights. 
 The impact of the Mexican Revolution remains a matter of debate. Reynolds (1970) 
indicates that between 1910 and 1925, Mexico’s GDP showed a net annual increase of 2.5% 
due to the performance of the mining and oil enclaves that were sheltered from the most 
severe effects of the violence. This is why the period from 1913–1917 was the time of the 
worst conflict, reaching its lowest point in 1915, but not affecting the entire decade. 
Womack (1978) questions the degree of destruction involved, pointing out that it was not 
sufficiently widespread to destroy the economic system.[22] Conversely, Haber and Razo 
have qualified the impact by focusing on the physical capital of industries and foreign trade. 
In the case of the railways, however, according to Ortiz Hernán (1988), Kuntz and Riguzzi 
(1996), Guajardo (1996, 1999) and Grunstein (2008), the normative and material destruction 
of the Revolution was both radical and definitive. 
 In addition to the railways, the Revolution had a major impact on the countryside that 
considerably delayed investment in agrarian mechanization, thereby reducing the 
development of the internal market and railway traffic. In his study of 3,611 rural villages in 
the 1930s that housed 17% of the country's population, Tannebaum found that 93.1% of the 
towns had no access to the railway, 96.5% had no access to tractors, 95.8% had no 
telegraphs and 54.3% lacked steel plows. This was compounded by the low per-hectare yield 
in comparison with other Latin American countries. Between 1934 and 1938, Mexico had a 
maize yield of 5.6 quintals per hectare, Chile had 13.8 (near the United States with 14 
quintals). Mexico produced 2 quintals of beans per hectare compared to Chile’s 8.5.[23]  
 Following the outbreak of the First World War, growth in Chile became unstable, 
particularly after the 1929 depression, compared with the performance it had achieved from 
1870 –1913, when the country joined the international economy,[24] but it turned into a 
country in sync with foreign trade that would contribute to training its labor force. 
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4.- MEXICO: THE RELATIVE IMPACT OF TRANSPORT MECHANIZATION 
The arrival in Veracruz in 1857 of the equipment and tools for the Mexican Railway marked 
the start of the massive introduction of machinery into the country. However, political 
instability meant that its impact was delayed until the lengthy dictatorship of General 
Porfirio Díaz (1876–1880/1884–1911) with the advent of engineering factories that 
produced metal goods rather than material for railways. Díaz’s dictatorship reactivated the 
economy thanks to the expansion of the mining sector, which facilitated access to sources of 
public and private financing, while the indirect fiscal link contributed to the construction of 
railways and encouraged an export boom that boosted the growth of the market and the 
expansion of production. From the 1880s onwards, the federal state encouraged railway 
construction without implementing a technical education policy. Railway construction 
entailed an enormous fiscal effort with tax exemptions, land concessions and cash subsidies 
that covered between 20 and 35% of construction costs.[25]   
 This was different from public intervention in Japan and Germany, where state action 
also encouraged technical education since Mexico lacked the institutions and key actions to 
implement this. Porfirio Díaz’ government only trusted foreign investment and despite 
having an overwhelmingly illiterate population, it did not assume active public action: in 
1895, 82% of the population over 10 years of age was illiterate, a figure that fell to 61% by 
1930, which was still high and similar to that of extremely backward regions. 
 These figures –with all the statistical problems of the time– show that in 1910, 
Mexico had nearly the same figures as czarist Russia and the Balkans, which until 1914, had 
educational levels that were only slightly better than they had been in medieval times, with 
illiteracy totaling between 75 and 80%. Mexico emerged from this situation in 1950 when an 
additional 50% of its population over the age of 10 years was recorded as being literate; the 
Federal District alone registered 40% literacy rates.[26] This was compounded by a labor 
structure with a low presence of services, which  was barely exceeded by the manufacturing 
sector with a predominance of the primary sector (see Table 2). 
[Table 2] 
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 In this scenario, railway construction and operation constituted a lost opportunity to 
train engineers and mechanics for various regions. Mexico had no institutions capable of 
meeting these demands. The education system was limited and scattered because the 
University of Mexico (the forerunner of UNAM) was closed in 1833, 1857, 1861 and 1865. 
There were only a few independent schools that had to wait to join the National University 
until 1910, the same year the Revolution started. Technical education at trade schools had to 
overcome a series of difficulties until the Instituto Politécnico Nacional was created in 1937. 
For this reason, degree courses in mechanical, electrical and industrial engineering had a 
hazardous existence between 1876 and 1911, during which period, nearly 448 engineers 
graduated. Between 1901 and 1927, 37.2% of university graduates were lawyers, with 
engineers accounting for 17.3%. Unlike France, where railway line construction between 
1829 and 1885 demanded 30% of the graduates from École Centrale, in Mexico, from the 
1930s onwards, conditions were in place to link technical professions to the economy.[27]  
 Another reason is that the American paradigm operated through the intense use of 
capital, technology and the selective migration of engineers and mechanics. This was the 
railway and mining foundries “package” implemented from the 1880s onwards.[28]  
 In the 1880s and 1890s, railway concessions linked Central Mexico to three points on 
the northern border: Nuevo Laredo (Nacional Mexicano); Ciudad Juárez (Central 
Mexicano), and Piedras Negras (Internacional Mexicano). At the same time, two lines linked 
the high plateau to the port of Veracruz. In Yucatán a narrow gauge network was built that 
was separate from the rest of the country. By 1910, Mexico had 19,280.3 km of railway 
lines.[29]  
 All this created a new labor sector over which company registers and official data 
disagree. In 1907, the federal state created the Ferrocarriles Nacionales de México (FNM) 
company by consolidating the largest companies in which government would be the majority 
shareholder. By 1911, this large, semi-private firm had a staff of 30,000, although the 1910 
census recorded 18,000 railway workers for the entire country. The 1895 census had a total 
of 55,678 persons working in transport activities and by 1921, it recorded 58,974. That same 
year, the payroll of FNM, which controlled nearly 60% of the lines and moved 80% of the 
freight tons, listed 47,486 employees, equivalent to 80% of all land transport workers. By 
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1921, it is estimated that the number of railway workers fluctuated between 60,000 and 
70,000.  
 This labor force, which was crucial to the movement of the Mexican economy, had to 
be trained without government support and until 1910, was a responsibility assumed by 
workers’ unions in order to nationalize jobs. 
 
4.1- STATE ATTEMPTS TO PRODUCE SKILLED LABOR 
In 1890, during the growth of the railway line and in order to create opportunities for 
Mexican workers, the government commissioned Daniel Palacios, a mechanical engineering 
professor from the National School of Engineers (ENI), to design a project for the Practical 
School of Engineers, which meant that the Secretariat of Public Works and Buildings created 
the Practical School of Engineers on the ENI premises. In 1891, 82 students enrolled, the 
majority of whom were under 16 years of age and had not completed elementary school. A 
year later, the Secretariat of Justice and Public Instruction (to which ENI became answerable 
in 1891) ordered that the Practical School be incorporated into the National School of Arts 
and Trades for Men, after which it disappeared.[30]  
 
4.2.- THE “UNION” ROUTE TO FIRM SCHOOLS 
Railway companies were not affected by the government's inactivity, since they taught 
Mexicans on the job, and kept the more skilled positions of engineers and mechanics for 
foreigners, a policy that was questioned by the workers. 
 The creation of the “Unión Fraternal” in 1890 marked the start of a labor movement 
that would culminate in 1910 with the “Union of Drivers, Engineers, Guards and Firemen” 
founded in Monterrey, which promoted Mexicans’ entry into these positions. Between 1904 
and 1908, the Grand League of Railway Employees, together with the Mechanics’ Union, set 
up a school in Monterrey for technical instruction.[31]  
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 Once FNM was created, the company’s Mexican directors supported the creation of 
the Department of Instruction and schools in 1910 so that Mexicans could be employed as 
telegraphers, train drivers, engineers and firemen. Incomes increased following the strike 
declared in 1912 by FNM’s U.S. employees, whose guilds wanted to control Mexicans’ 
access and impose operating orders in English.[32] The company refused and the Americans 
withdrew. This decision was finalized in 1914 by the increased violence of the Revolution 
and the invasion of the port of Veracruz by U.S. troops. In 1909, the number of foreigners in 
FNM was 1,075, of a total of 26,106 employees, which was equivalent to 4.1%. As a result 
of the Revolution, this figure fell to 179 in 1917, which was equivalent to 0.5% of a total of 
32,796 employees. By 1925, these totaled 38, in other words, 0.08% of the personnel.[33]  
 
4.3.- LOSS OF TRAINING DUE TO THE REVOLUTION 
The outbreak of the Revolution meant that companies lost control over their labor force, jobs 
and hierarchies were altered and competing sides put an end to unionized firm schools and 
hampered activities within the Department of Instruction. A battery of skills that had taken 
decades to create were lost, foreign workers migrated and the few skilled Mexican workers 
either ended up with one of the competing sides or migrated. Serious intangible damage with 
repercussions for the future was caused by the fact that the merit system and the mechanisms 
for validating knowledge and skills were abolished.[34]   
 In 1916, according to the executive president of FNM (which was confiscated in 
1914), the majority of the personnel who had joined because of the Revolution, were 
incompetent or controlled by the military.  In order to arrive at a solution, central 
government, led by Venustiano Carranza, was forced to oppose the “carbine rights,” in other 
words, labor rights obtained by force by personnel admitted under the protection of the 
military leaders, who opposed “the merit system.”[35] In 1916, the Deposit of Revolutionary 
Railwaymen was created and the Secretariat of War and the Navy set up schools for those 
that had joined as a result of the military campaigns. The idea was to demilitarize economic 
activities and reduce the military’s power.[36] But the fighting continued, as did forced 
recruitment. By the early 1920s, the engineering and traffic personnel who had promoted the 
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nationalization of jobs had changed. They were unproductive and their merits were more 
political than technical.[37]  
 
4.4- THE CONSOLIDATION OF HUMAN CAPITAL WITH LOW PRODUCTIVITY 
The alteration caused by the Revolution led the government of President Álvaro Obregón 
(1920–1924) to take measures to restore railway activity, but they lacked personnel trained 
at firm schools. In 1920, Ernesto Ocaranza Llano, general manager of FNM, ordered that all 
new engines be assigned to competent engineers and took up the railway school project.[38] 
In 1922, the Ministry of Education (SEP) promoted the creation of Railwaymen’s school to 
train six types of professionals ranging from engineers to firemen in three years. Unlike in 
1891, the premises were built in Mexico City in early 1922, but by the end of that year, 
construction was suspended. Work resumed in 1923 as part of the School of Arts and Trades 
for Men.[39] Once again, the School of Arts absorbed another railway school. 
 The year 1923 proved crucial in putting an end to the attempts by FNM –the 
country’s largest company that would absorb other lines– to train its own labor force by 
adopting high standards through the institutionalization of schools. This occurred because of 
conjunctural political reasons, whose consequences would be structural. The rebellions of 
the time forced governments to make a pact with this labor sector to pacify and create a 
reliable political base, by imposing the criteria of political performance over technical and 
economic efficiency. 
 The effects  began to be felt in 1921, with the strike that broke out in FNM over the 
two organizations’ attempts to achieve official recognition: the Order of Engineers, and the 
Union of Drivers, Engineers, Guards and Firemen. In order to deal with the strike, in 1921, 
Mexican consuls in California, Arizona, Texas and New Mexico were ordered to recruit 
Mexican railwaymen who had migrated as a result of the Revolution; in Mexico, staff from 
the South-Pacific Railway line signed up.[40]  
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 Personnel brought in by the government joined the Union of Drivers, Engineers, 
Guards and Firemen, but once the strike was over, the FNM decision ordered that they sit an 
examination in order to be able to retain their positions, for which they were given 90 days 
to prepare. The Union asked for a period of 120 days for the exam according to the “custom” 
established in 1912 by which Mexican personnel were given a period of up to four months. 
Some of the applicants sat the exam up to 18 months after they had been promoted, while 
those who failed were given time to pass it. Thus, with little respect for formalities, they all 
passed the exam and were confirmed in their positions, and the process was repeated nine 
years later.[41]  
 This explains why the projects put forward by certain unions were frustrated. In 
October 1923, the leaders of the Third Grand Convention of the FNM  Department of 
Driving Force and Machinery went to José Vasconcelos, Education Minister, to inform him 
that since they could not set up their own school within the contract with FNM, they wanted 
the SEP to assign a budget to install it. In November, a rebellion that several of the workers 
joined did away with the initiative.[42]  
 The situation was compounded by the elimination of the FNM Department of 
Instruction, created in 1910, during the movement to nationalize personnel. It was closed by 
Ocaranza Llano in 1923 because it had failed to achieve satisfactory results and only “a 
significant minority” had attended.[43] The Department was refloated three years later, but 
only for transport instruction. Both government and the unions wanted teaching alternatives, 
but the merit system adopted by Mexican workers before 1910 was being marginalized. It 
was replaced by an unproductive work culture based on empirical learning with an ever-
decreasing yield (see Table 3). 
[Table 3] 
 Physical productivity fell to less than one third during the period from 1916–1917 
and subsequently recovered after the worst part of the conflict. It improved after FNM was 
handed over to an administration run by U.S. shareholders in 1926. This recovery was due to 
the engineers. In the workshops, however, productivity was extremely low, since they were 
run by “other operators in the mechanical department,” who, since 1921, accounted for 
nearly 50% of the personnel in this department and were a burden on productivity. In this 
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context, improvements occurred among the groups whose members could be rationalized, 
while the authorities tolerated those who had joined because of the conflict that developed 
with a powerful political base. Since the 1920s, the railway, petrol and electricity unions 
acquired enormous political importance and defined the working rules for the following 
decades, which were consolidated during the first collective work contract at FNM in 
1925.[44]  
 Over the next few years, training followed a slow route of trial and error until the 
Institute of Railway Training was established in the 1950s and in that same decade, as part of 
the change to diesel traction, the Diesel School opened. In 1966, the School of Specialization 
in Railway Transport was founded. It was intended to be an organization with a greater 
capacity for training professionals in all branches of railway transport, but failed to achieve 
this and was closed in 1971. 
 
5.- CHILE: A TECHNOCRATIC ROUTE TO TRAINING HUMAN CAPITAL 
Although Chile shares some of the traits of the Mexican scenario, it differs because of early 
state participation, the emergence of a sector of industrial businessmen linked to the railway 
and the fact that during the period from 1910–1914 it enjoyed institutional stability, taking a 
different route by assuming a formal means of training. As a result of the early development 
of the state apparatus, whose nucleus were public works, Chilean civil engineers defined 
their professional profile and the role they would play in public decisions. They structured 
this profile in the 1880s when they created the State Railroad Firm (EFE), the Institute of 
Engineers, the Ministry of Industries and Public Works (MIOP) and the Head Office of 
Public Works. Their autonomy increased in 1928 with the Ministry of Public Works and 
Buildings in the years following the state's intervention in the economy.[45]  
 This began with the advent of the railway in Chile, which was encouraged by sectors 
that were inserted into the international economy: metal mining, and agriculture. In order to 
deal with mining, the Copiapó Railway was inaugurated in 1851, while the landowners and 
merchants in the central zone of the country formed the railway companies between Santiago 
and Valparaíso (FCSV) and the South (FCS) in 1852 and 1856. Whereas the lines for mining 
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were built with the participation of foreign capital, railways in the agrarian provinces 
received contributions from private capitals and the state, whose positive response was to 
extend lines,  offer low tariffs and create the EFE in 1884, which consolidated the 940 km of 
state-owned lines.[46]  
 When this new means of transport arrived, the prevailing view was that the country’s 
only advantage was the laborers’ work. The railways and workshops were a positive 
influence, as French scientist Claudio Gay noted in 1865, because of their ability to change 
the habits of a country accustomed to monotony and resignation.[47] For everyday 
operations, the companies had to recruit a group of foreign workers and provide a handful of 
Chilean workers with industrial training, thereby creating a small sector within a mass of 
workers dominated by farm workers. In 1875, the state railways (FCS and FCS) employed 
nearly 4% of the country's group of metal mechanic trades: 8.3% of the engineers, 10.4% of 
the mechanics and 28.3% of the firemen in Chile. These workers had a significant presence 
in the mining provinces, in the capital of Santiago and in Valparaíso, the main port.[48]  
 The engine bosses and overseers hired labor abroad through import firms, but the 
increase in the scale of operations led firms to take initiatives to train more local labor. In 
1865, in the FCSV, Superintendent Ángel Prieto y Cruz conceived of the idea of annexing 
the School of Arts and Trades (EAO), an institution founded in Santiago in 1849 following 
the model of French technical education, with workshops from the company in Valparaíso to 
provide workers in a “timely, immediate fashion.” The annexation would provide access to 
100 apprentices who would have to adapt to industrial discipline rather than regarding 
themselves as master craftsmen, but the proposal did not prosper.[49]  
 Equally unsuccessful was another attempt at annexation by the National Foundry in 
1869. This state establishment was set up in 1865 to produce cannons for the war with Spain 
over its attempts to reconquer Chile on the South American coast.[50] Its subsequent growth 
led its director to propose the annexation of the EAO, a proposal that was rejected by the war 
ministry and a group of foundry workers who feared the competition. Given the 
impossibility of having their own school, the railroads continued training in the production 
process itself, encouraged by the pressure of the traffic. The same thing happened in the 
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FCSV when the increase in wheat exports in 1866 facilitated the entry of “the children of the 
country” and the hiring of EAO students.[51]  
 
5.1.- “ON THE JOB” TRAINING 
As in Mexico, the commonest method was to train the farm hands who came in from the 
countryside during the production process itself. In 1875, at the Valparaíso station of FCSV, 
farm hands accounted for 60% of those employed in the workshops and in the shunting 
yards.[52] The shift towards worker status began by filing the rust off the equipment being 
repaired. In 1857, an engineer by the name of Robert Anderson suggested to the FCS 
directors that he train Chilean fireman, in return for extra pay, an example that was followed 
by other foreigners. The apprentices were given simple tasks that helped them learn, such as 
moving the American-made engines that lacked injectors for the cauldron water, which had 
to be moved short distances. However, their lack of mechanical knowledge meant that 
trainees were unable to prevent the engines from breaking down, which led to higher 
operating expenses.[53]  
 Another incentive to nationalize jobs came from the salary increase in the 1870s, 
which required mechanizing, but also lowering qualification levels and incorporating 
Chilean apprentices. At the FCS workshops in Santiago, machine tools were introduced in 
1871 to “economize workers’ time” as a result of workers' migration to Peru. However, the 
mechanization process was not very drastic because the increase in price of foreign labor and 
the economic crisis, which reached  this point in 1878, raised costs. A year later, the 
outbreak of the war between Chile and Peru and Bolivia intensified Chileans’ learning since 
many foreign mechanics began working for the Navy.[54]  
 These phenomena affected the composition of the personnel. In 1882, in its engine 
and arsenal department, the FCSV had 308 technically qualified people, including engineers, 
firemen and other workshop specialists, 40.5% of whom had been hired since 1879. If 
unskilled personnel are included, then 25.3% of the employees were foreigners. 
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5.2.- OTHER TRAINERS: THE STATE AND INDUSTRIAL BUSINESSMEN 
The creation of EFE in 1884 enabled Chilean engineers and workers to be promoted to 
nearly all levels of skilled labor when there was a strong demand for skilled labor from 
industry, mining and private railways. This demand had to be met by a sector of engineering 
firms which, from the 1880s onwards, began to build carriages and engines for the state 
railways and shared the same labor base. 
 The emergence of a sector of engineering industries was one of the main differences 
from Mexico, which did not have a railway carriage-producing firm until 1952. This 
provided Chile with a set of public and private initiatives for establishing technical schools, 
because of the degree of activity of the Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (SFF), a trade union 
organization of the industrialists founded in 1833, and by the MIOP. This period saw the 
emergence of proposals such as that of an industrialist called Santiago Hardie, who proposed 
setting up an EAO in Valparaíso. In 1887, Lever, Murphy y Cía. gave EAO a full-size 
wooden model of an engine for practices.[55] It is interesting to note that its owner, William 
J. Murphy, born in Smethwick, had received his education at James Watt & Co.’s schools 
before starting work with Pacific Steam Navigation, the firm through which he arrived in 
Chile.[56]  
 In the early 20th century, technical education under the supervision of the MIOP 
centered on EAO which, from the 1880s onwards, had been reformed, providing it with a 
37,150-square meter building to house 300 boarders, 100 day students and 22 teachers. Its 
installations had industrial capacity and were connected to the railway which, in 1897, 
enabled it to repair an engine and suggest to EFE that it build carriages and an engine. This 
petition was rejected by the industrialists who produced material for the firm. There was also 
an Industrial School in Chillán, while the SFF had 12 night schools with a total of 725 
students.[57]  
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5.3.- THE NEED TO INTERNALIZE TECHNICAL SCHOOLS 
In the early 20th century, the growth of EFE operations called for a change in the technical 
base and the personnel's skills. An examination of this subject was drafted in 1899 by the 
government's technical consultant, a Belgian engineer by the name of Omar Huet, who 
would subsequently implement a number of changes. He pointed out that Chilean workers 
were jacks-of-all-trades, which was incompatible with manufacturing and railways where 
perfect knowledge of the profession was required. There was a need to regulate jobs, define 
responsibilities, introduce industrial discipline and have knowledge acquired at schools. The 
characteristics of the country, however, meant that these demands would have to be reduced 
and adapted.[58]  
 Another examination was drawn up by Máximo Dorlhiac, a French engineer who 
retired as an EFE workshop inspector in 1911. Dorlhiac found that there was a total lack of 
elementary scientific notions and when he did find suitable workers, he was unable to hire 
them, since the others refused to accept someone who would be promoted more rapidly, as 
was the case of the few EAO students. The bosses did not train personnel to take over from 
them, due to the lack of labor stability. In 1912, of a total of 23,140 state railway employees, 
15% had contracts and 85% were day workers.[59]  
 Once again the solution was to absorb the EAO in order to have personnel and an 
industrial capacity capable of producing spare parts, providing maintenance and building 5–
8 wagons and one engine a year. The idea was part of the solutions that were discussed to 
reorganize EFE in keeping with a more corporate management model and to stress the role 
of engineers in their exploitation. 
 In 1913, a Chilean engineer named Domingo V. Santa María, a member of the 
commissions for reorganizing EFE, said that workers should be recruited from among the 
personnel's children. At the same time, EAO should contribute the technological knowledge, 
workshops and practice, while families should provide “industrial discipline.”[60]  
 
 
Guillermo Guajardo 
 
Page 22 
5.4.- REORGANIZATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE ON THE WAY TO FIRM SCHOOLS 
Changes began to take place in 1907 and were implemented by Omer Huet as Director 
General of EFE, who created regulations for the personnel, rationalized tasks, reassigned, 
reduced and hired new personnel. By that time, it was felt that as a public firm, EFE was 
subject to the pressure of political parties and that therefore, these measures would affect its 
influence. As a result, the Personnel and Control Service was created to review the situation 
of 3,000 contract workers, many of whom were recommended by parliamentarians.[61]  
 The 1907 reorganization was designed to lower operating costs, increase efficiency, 
reduce and improve the quality of the personnel and change the technology. A new 
reorganization in 1914 stressed changing the structure and creating schools to train 
workshop and engine personnel. Work also began on the construction of the San Bernardo 
Central Workshops with modern organization and technology to concentrate workers at a 
site  far from the capital, with more room for workshops and dwellings and also to cover 
other aspects, as noted by the Ministry of Industries: “moving them away from government 
headquarters prevents the latter from being subjected to the pressure that may be exerted by 
the operators.” The first workshops with fewer personnel began operating in 1920.[62]  
 The new 1914 EFE Regulations stipulated that workshops would give preference to 
students who had completed diploma courses “at the industrial establishments of the state or 
at others with equivalent studies.” EAO students were admitted to the workshops and in 
1917, several engines were repaired at the School’s workshops. During this process of 
change, workers wished to establish their means of training. In 1914, the First EFE 
Convention of Engineers and Firemen was held, at which it was suggested that employees’ 
children should have a normal education. A school and library would be built to provide 
technical instruction for the workers, and the most outstanding of these would be sent 
abroad.[63]  
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5.5.- FIRM SCHOOLS: THE UNIVERSIDAD POPULAR FERROVIARIA, THE INSTITUTO FERROVIARIO 
AND THE MIGRATION OF HUMAN CAPITAL TO OTHER SECTORS 
The year 1914 marked the end of a type of railway labor trained using the incentive of 
workers' self-instruction processes. By then, the labor mass involved in these changes was 
considerable, since the EFE workshops were as important as the sector comprising the 
factories that produced transport material, foundries and metal, which that year employed 
3,680 operators who received approximately six million pesos in salaries. Conversely, the 
EFE Department of Traction and Arsenals employed approximately 6,425 workers, who 
received 16 million pesos in salaries.[64]  
 What was happening was that new engineering personnel were taking over tasks that 
had previously been carried out by personnel trained “on the job,” meaning that a number of 
problems had to be ironed out. An example of this was the request by the “Santiago Watt” 
Federation of Engineers and Firemen, who in 1919 requested that the job of coal inspector 
be given to a person with practical training, rather than to recently graduated engineers, a 
petition that was turned down by the EFE Board of Directors.[65]  
 In 1920, at the request of a group of engineers and the professor from the school of 
machinists, the Railway University opened with 30 students, the aim being to improve the 
personnel’s “culture and technical training.” The following year it had 80 students and began 
to be subsidized by the EFE Head Office. This establishment enabled personnel to be trained 
and retained, since by this time, the firm had to stop the enormous flow of people towards 
other sectors of the economy, particularly once they had completed their instruction.[66]  
 This establishment was subsequently renamed the Universidad Popular Ferroviaria 
(UPF) and by 1934, it had 143 students and a small library of 686 books. In 1935, it 
reformed its program and the UPF was turned into the Instituto Ferroviario, increasing its 
coverage and courses with humanities, civic education and political economics, and 
replacing the certificate of Assistant Engineer with one of a certificate of maturity in a four-
year cycle. By that time, there were nearly 1,000 students at various types of EFE schools. 
The Institute’s aim was “to provide general humanistic and technical training for non-
professional railway personnel and instill character, personality and a spirit of discipline as a 
complement to education.”[67]  
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 The growth and autonomy of its graduates was such that in 1958, when the College 
of Engineers and the College of Technicians were founded to regulate the exercise of the 
profession and train the country's engineers to “occupy positions of an administrative, fiscal, 
semi-fiscal, municipal or private nature, which would require holding the respective degree,” 
the only exception was that EFE could nominate the graduates of the Instituto 
Ferroviario.[68]  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Railway technology had a positive impact on human capital training in the cases studied 
because of its complexity, capital intensity and new work methods. This occurred through 
cycles and routes of informal and formal learning, which in either case, led to firm schools 
with different results. This is different from certain approaches currently in vogue in the 
Latin American region, such as dependency sociology, which has stressed the relations of 
domination implicit in the relationship with the United States and Great Britain. The cases of 
Chile and Mexico indicate that the links with centers of innovation is an advantage that 
failed to be exploited due to factors of an internal nature. 
 Despite its smaller size and distance from a center of innovations, Chile managed to 
complete the route from workshop to school, shifting from an empirical system involving the 
training of intangible assets to a formal one, although it preserved traces of the former 
system as well as the inefficiency characteristic of economic backwardness. This was helped 
by the development of a British model of industrial and educational internalization, the early 
existence of a training establishment such as EAO which followed the French model. Its 
autonomy enabled it to survive attempts at annexation and conversion into a firm school, 
while contributing the scarce skilled labor to various sectors. It provided a platform of skills 
enabling Chilean railroads to shift towards the American model from 1914, when relations 
with Great Britain and Europe were weakened. 
 Another factor was the early development of the national state, which relied on an 
apparatus of administrators and engineers responsible for nationalizing jobs without 
rejecting the contributions of immigrants, as regards both production and management, since 
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in addition to British engineers, EFE had Belgian and German directors who were replaced 
by Chilean engineers. This key intangible, greater political stability than other parts of Latin 
America enabled various social actors such as administrators, technocrats, artisans, the 
working class aristocracy and the middle classes to use convergent strategies to satisfy their 
interests, define class identities and train human capital. 
 Conversely, the Mexican case combined complexity with greater backwardness, 
which is all the more striking because of its resources, position, foreign investment flows 
and proximity to a center of innovation such as the United States. 
 In this case, nationalistic historiography has defended union power and railway 
statization by denouncing the negative impact of foreign investments that would have ousted 
national workers and professionals from better paid positions. Nevertheless, as Lorey points 
out, the problem in Mexico was that when the railways were built, there were no capital 
asset industries or a technical professional education for dealing with the growth of 
infrastructure and production, which therefore had to rely on foreign technology and 
skills.[69] And contrary to what nationalistic historiography suggests, this was actually 
positive: foreign capital, technology and workers created a modern sector within a backward 
economy. The delay was caused by the interruptions and slowness with which the tracks 
were built and the lack of interest in creating a university and technical education apparatus. 
The initiatives were too late and incomplete to take advantage of being next to a center of 
innovations. There were, however, some sectors that managed to take advantage of this. 
 Imitating the American model of unions and workers’ guilds was a powerful method 
that enabled Mexican labor to be trained within a technological and organizational model 
that externalized to provide cheaper solutions, unlike the British model that was defined on 
the basis of safety and quality, which proved difficult to achieve in the New World. 
 The American work ethic absorbed by Mexican employees adapted almost 
symbiotically to the process of state participation in over one half of the Mexican railways 
begun by FNM from 1907 onwards. Government interest coincided with that of the unions: 
achieving autonomy in relation to American personnel, which they achieved in 1912. Union 
and state initiatives overcame the problems of American externalization, which made it 
possible to build the majority of the 19,000 km existing in 1920, which had not established a 
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local fabric but rather pragmatic links with the industry and world of work north of the Rio 
Grande. 
 The tragedy in the railway sector –and others– was that just as a generation of 
“Americanized” Mexican workers was beginning to emerge as regards the conception of 
work, skills and perspectives of development, the Revolution broke out which, with its more 
destructive phases from 1913 onwards, put an end to this weak fabric of human capital 
trained in the “merit system.” Instability at every level lasted just over a decade, completely 
changed the scenario and the order of factors. American pragmatism gave way to a form of 
collectivism disguised as nationalism and xenophobia that justified the implementation of 
“carbine rights.” These rights had not been fully eliminated even after 1920, and activity was 
restored on the basis of political pragmatism that used parts of what already existed to move 
traffic without “gringos.” The industry was forced to return to the initial matrix, but within a 
context of greater backwardness: the engineers’ and mechanics’ unions became part of the 
sector on which attempts at recovery depended and coexisted with a broad mass of workers 
who joined industry without much prior training and once again, had to be trained as they 
went along. 
 American-style unions and associations were forced to give way to the reproduction 
of unions as apparatuses for political control and social mobilization, reducing the 
importance technical training had once enjoyed in order to forge a social identity. Simulation 
and centralization in corporate unionism, which had no need to justify its productivity, 
marked the history of Mexican railways until their privatization in 1996. 
 The Mexican Revolution has been portrayed as an event that favored workers’ 
sectors. Our evidence, however, indicates that it destroyed an important social fabric in the 
industrial and service sector that was maturing in the form of initiatives, institutions and 
confidence in work. 
 The economic nationalism that replaced it never managed to stop resorting to the 
American center of innovation, although it was forced to do so slowly because of the small 
scope for maneuvering that labor legislation established for hiring foreigners. It was allowed 
to purchase equipment but not industrial or management talent, meaning that it had to wait 
until the latter was locally trained. The “dependent” part of the American model of “biggest 
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and fastest” continued to be reproduced. FNM adopted it again in the 1940s and in the 
following decade by importing diesel engines. The Engine and Diesel School for training 
engineers and mechanics meant that a small number of workers were able to increase the 
volume of traffic without questioning the other processes, in other words, employing the 
same post-revolutionary strategy. 
 Lastly, cultural patterns played a key role in hampering the development of human 
capital, but that goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
*   *   * 
 
 
Table 1. STYLES WITHIN THE ATLANTIC PARADIGM OF PRODUCTIVE INTERNALIZATION AND 
EXTERNALIZATION IN THE 19TH CENTURY 
 
Equipment UK 
internalization 
Canada 
internalization 
U.S. 
externalization 
towards 
suppliers 
U.S:-Northeast 
Pennsylvania-
type 
internalization 
U.S:-West 
”Far West” 
internalization 
Locomotives X X X X  
Freight wagons  X X  X 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. MÉXICO: ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION (EAP), 1895–1910 
 
Socio-professional categories 1895 1900 1910 
Total EAP 5,017,655 5,430,230 5,591,823 
• Farm workers and pickers 2,625,234 2,563,101 3,122,956 
• Mine workers 89,337 105,824 101,290 
• Craftsmen and industrial work 849,369 1,011,858 972,134 
 
Source: Cardoso and Hermosillo (1987), Table 3: 46–48. 
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Table 3. MÉXICO: PRODUCTIVITY INDICATORS OF FNM PERSONNEL, 1908–1930 
 
 
Years 
Tons of commercial 
freight per FNM post 
Thousands of Ton-
km per FNM post 
Thousands of Tons-
km per equipment 
maintenance 
workshop jobs. 
Thousands of Tton-
km per engineering 
post 
1908-09 218.6 75.8 - - 
1909-10 - 77.9 - - 
1910-11 219.0 78.7 - - 
1911-12 207.7 74.2 - - 
1912-13 229.4 77.6 - - 
1916-17 65.9 - - - 
1917-18 115.7 39.1 139.3 - 
1920-21 79.9 29.6 101.0 1,530.0 
1921-22 98.8 38.0 126.5 2,591.9 
1922-23 131.6 49.0 143.4 2,978.8 
1923-24 132.4 51.7 146.9 3,374.1 
1924-25 149.1 56.4 166.2 3,845.8 
1925-26 - 60.0 180.2 4,736.3 
1927 - 101.2 356.2 9,864.9 
1928 166.8 71.0 - - 
1929 171.1 80.0 - - 
1930 160.7 78.2 262.9 7,119.5 
 
• Figures for 1927 are higher because the social year comprised the period from July 1,1926 to December 31, 1927 because 
at this time, the old measurement from July 1 to June 30 of the following year was changed to January to December of 
each year. 
• In order to calculate productivity, we have adapted the measurement by Ferrocarriles Nacionales de México in 1992 based 
on dividing the number of jobs by traffic units, which are the sum of tons-kilometer and passengers-kilometer. But in this 
case, since we only have freight data, we have divided the total number of jobs by tons-kilometer (Ton-km), a unit 
obtained by multiplying freight tons by the mean distance covered by the latter, which is used to measure traffic 
performance. 
 
Source: Drawn up on the basis of FNM.INA, between June 30, 1909 and December 31, 1936. Ferrocarriles 
Nacionales de México, 1992: 54-55.  
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